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ABSTRACT
The realities of social injustice in the present South African context, with its great 
and growing gap between rich and poor and unequal distribution of wealth and 
resources, are also acutely visible in the health-care sector. Genetic engineering 
would lead to some children having the cards stacked overwhelmingly in their 
favour, raising the concern for the justice or fairness of this type of biotechnology. 
In this contribution, I argue that the notion of justice as fairness, put forward by 
Rawls, and the focus on human dignity in Moltmann’s theology can help address the 
bioethical challenges of genetic engineering in the context of inequality, specifically 
in South Africa.
1. INTRODUCTION
Reflecting on a bioethical matter as sophisticated as human genetic 
engineering (GE)2 from a South African perspective might not, initially, 
seem like an obvious stance to take. After all, being a developing country, 
biotechnology in South Africa is not at the forefront of biomedical 
technology.3 One might also ask, rightfully, whether there are not much 
1 Paper presented at the Humboldt Summer School on Imperial Religions, 
Theology and Indigenous Knowledge, 10-14 June 2014, Berlin, Germany.
2 In this contribution, genetic engineering is understood as the deliberate genetic 
alteration of a human embryo by modifying its genetic make-up.
3 In 2001, the National Biotechnology Strategy was published. In 2007, a ten-
year innovation plan was drawn up, which delineated an ambitious strategy 
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more pressing ethical matters to consider in a country wrought with 
social inequality. In this regard, Ryan (2012:974-975) indicates that, 
in many regions, access to basic health care, clean water, satisfactory 
nourishment, maternal and child care, as well as the treatment and 
prevention of HIV/AIDS are far more serious crises than the availability of 
genetic treatments.
There are a few reasons, however, why I view this as an extremely 
relevant and prolific origin for a theological reflection on the aspect of 
social justice as introduced by the GE of human beings. One reason is the 
prevalence of so-called genetic tourism, where couples from developed 
countries travel to countries in the developing world to undergo in 
vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment as a result of the much lower costs of 
this treatment and the much higher availability of egg donors because 
of financial incentives. This, of course, also raises a variety of ethical 
dilemmas. There are numerous other questions and challenges raised by 
the utilisation of biotechnology such as genetically engineering human 
beings, for example, the perspectives of human beings and personhood 
that are upheld; the impact it could have on gender relations, people with 
disabilities and children born after genetic intervention; the desirability or 
not of creating what scholars such as Fukuyama (2002) term “posthuman”, 
and Young (2006) “transhuman”; eugenics, and a number of doctrinal 
concerns. In this paper, however, I shall only examine the aspect of social 
justice and offer a theological reflection thereupon.
The realities of social injustice in the present South African context, with 
its great and growing gap between rich and poor and unequal distribution 
of wealth and resources, are also acutely visible in the health-care sector. 
In my opinion, this makes it a productive starting point for entering into 
the Christian bioethical discourse. Of course, it also has extensive and far-
reaching implications for the larger discussion on GE and what impact it 
would have on the current South African context; in other words, between 
those who would be able to afford GE, and those who would not have 
access, were this type of biotechnology to become commercially available. 
to turn South Africa into one of the top ten nations in the world in terms of the 
pharmaceutical, nutraceutical, flavour, fragrance and biopesticide industries by 
2018. [Online.] Retrieved from: http://www.aatf-africa.org/userfiles/AfricaBio_
Engels.pdf [2016, 18 March]. This, however, has not happened. While genetic 
engineering does take place at present in South Africa, modifying the genetic 
make-up of human embryos is prohibited. [Online.] Retrieved from: http://www.
geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=304 [2016, 18 March].
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Ryan (2012:977) indicates that high-demand genetic therapies such as GE 
are likely to be both very costly and (as in vitro fertilization and other 
reproductive technologies) available only to those who are willing 
and able to pay for them.
Gavaghan (2007:172) also sums up the issue at hand; the fear is that 
unequal access to this kind of technology could cause or exacerbate pre-
existing divisions. In the next section, I shall examine the possibility and 
ways in which biotechnology such as GE could conceivably be utilised to 
divide the human race.
2. THE POSSIBILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC 
ENGINEERING DIVIDING THE HUMAN RACE
The first argument levelled against the use of GE is that, if the wealthy 
were to use GE to prevent certain diseases in their children, the possibility 
exists that empathy and concern for these diseases could disappear and 
that they could later become “low-class” diseases. Furthermore, if illness 
is thought of as something avoidable, social provision and care for the 
sick might also be reduced (Gavaghan 2007:172-175). Fukuyama (2002:16) 
further notes: 
If wealthy parents suddenly have open to them the opportunity to 
increase the intelligence of their children as well as that of all their 
subsequent descendants, then we have the markings not just of a 
moral dilemma but of a full-scale class war.
This possibility, of course, also raises significant questions for theo- 
logical ethics.
It should, however, also be borne in mind that the wealthy already have 
more access to expensive medical procedures and better health care 
and that those who can afford to go to private clinics and hospitals are 
already in a much better position than those who are forced to wait in line 
in state clinics and government-sponsored hospitals. Obviously, this also 
raises questions of social justice, but it serves to indicate that it would be 
improper and incorrect to accord these problems only to the use of GE in 
the future.
It is also true that genetic make-up is inherently unfair, even when only 
viewed in natural processes. Two world-renowned athletes (naturally, 
without making use of GE) having a baby together are very likely to 
pass on genes that would equip their future child for athletics and sport 
in ways that surpass that of the child of a couple where only one of the 
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parents are slightly athletic. Can we term this unfair? Perhaps. Can we 
do something about it? Unlikely. Genetic make-up, in every instance, is a 
lottery. In addition, there is no guarantee that even parents, using every 
type of technology available to have a particular type of child, will get that 
particular child. Even if they do, it would still be incumbent on that child to 
develop and practise the traits that s/he was given.
Sandel (2007:12) also reacts to the argument of unfairness used in 
cases of, for example, genetically improved athletes: 
It has always been the case that some athletes are better endowed, 
genetically, than others. And yet we do not consider the natural 
inequalities of genetic endowments to undermine the fairness of 
competitive sport.
Sandel (2007:3) further refers to critique against choosing the 
attributes of children and asks why some component of unpredictability 
or randomness seems to make a moral difference. He also indicates that, 
while the often-levelled criticism that it violates the child’s autonomy to 
be able to choose his/her life plan for him-/herself, wrongly implies that 
children born naturally are free to choose their own aptitudes and traits 
(Sandel 2007:6-7). The ethical question to be asked is, therefore, rather one 
of the autonomy of future children born after intervention by GE, whether it 
is ethically permissible to decide the characteristics of children before they 
are born, as opposed to letting it randomly be up to the genetic lottery.
What is true, however, is that GE would lead to some having the cards 
stacked in their favour, or as Gavaghan (2007:179) quite eloquently puts it, 
some children could be born “not only with ‘silver spoons’ in their mouths, 
but with ‘golden genes’ in their chromosomes”. He summarises the issue 
at hand: 
What would be unfair about a genetic supermarket is not that some 
people would emerge from it with unearned advantages – that, of 
course, happens anyway – but rather that some people had the 
odds stacked overwhelmingly in their favour from the beginning 
(Gavaghan 2007:182).
It is undeniable that those who are able to afford it and have better 
access to health care and other facilities are already in a superior position 
to those who do not, and the aspect of a divided human race is no longer 
something that science fiction warns us of, but reality. Daniels (2001:323) 
does not view this to be particularly problematic: 
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The rich can buy special security systems for their homes. They can 
buy safer cars. They can buy private schooling for their children. Why 
not allow them to buy supplementary health care for their families?.
Verhey (2002) also adds that genetic options may one day be socially 
enforced. It should also be noted that a truly pro-choice position recognises 
the decision to not use pre-implantation diagnoses as a valid choice and 
is not a promoter of this technology (Gavaghan 2007:2-3). Often, those 
who argue the freedom of choice4 in favour of biotechnologies such as GE 
becoming commercially available, are of the opinion that this would imply 
that everyone should make use of it. Gavaghan reminds one that when 
one makes a case for the freedom of choice, opting not to make use of 
available biotechnology is also a legitimate and valid choice that should 
be respected.
However, as Callahan (1987:228) postulates, specified choices usually 
make options mandatory, whether by law, economic force or simply by 
social custom. In the same way that keeping someone in a coma on life 
support where the likelihood of recovery is slim was, at some point in time, 
available only in extreme cases and have now become the norm, GE could 
walk the same road. For this reason, Gavaghan (2007:5) indicates that a 
genuine concern for justice or fairness 
cannot be addressed by restricting access to GCTs, [germinal choice 
technologies] which are at worst just one manifestation of unfairness.
It is then quite clear that, when examining social justice and GE from 
a theological-ethical perspective, it should be borne in mind that what 
we are, in fact, examining is the exacerbating of existing social divides, 
segregation and inequalities. The divided human race, as conceived in 
science fiction, finds just one manifestation in disparities and discrimination 
in the utilisation of biotechnology.
In addition, biotechnology such as GE can also be viewed as power. 
Deane-Drummond (1997:82) refers to the power wielded by biotechnology 
in agricultural practice as “becoming a means of oppressing Third World 
economies and [it] seems to drive a wedge between rich and poor nations”. 
The same can also said to be true of biotechnology where human beings 
are concerned. As a result, the long-term social consequences have to be 
considered, also confirming that the issue under discussion is much wider 
and more extensive than science fiction would have us believe.
The realisation that inequalities and a lack of social justice through the 
utilisation of GE is simply one symptom of a larger social concern also 
4 Cf. also Peters 1998:15-20.
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serves to include the contribution of Christian theology to this debate. If 
one would simply argue that the disparities that would be exacerbated 
through GE exist in any instance and are also, at present, part of our 
societies and that it, therefore, does not raise a new matter of concern, the 
discourse is closed. Christian theology, however, does not only address 
the possible matters of social injustice that could arise in the future, but 
also speaks out against injustice in the here and now.
3. HUMAN GENETIC ENGINEERING AND SOCIAL 
JUSTICE
Although there are numerous theories of justice and of social justice, I have 
chosen to engage with the theory devised by Rawls, given that this theory 
is thoroughly social from its very inception to its implementation. “Justice” 
is a very loaded term that can mean different things to different people. 
One of the most significant works in the entire field of social and political 
philosophy in the English-speaking world after WW II is Rawls’ A theory 
of justice (1971). Rawls’ theory is presented as a modern alternative to 
utilitarianism and he hopes that it is congruent to “the belief that justice 
must be associated with fairness and the moral equality of persons” 
(Shaw 2005:95). Justice is not simply a matter of social service, but it is 
thoroughly social. Society, in Rawls’ view, is a cooperative undertaking 
among its members. 
Rawls’ hypothetical-contract approach and the principles of justice 
that he develops from this approach are particularly important. He asks: 
What would we choose as the fundamental principles to govern society if, 
hypothetically, we were to meet in the “original position”? Rawls suspects 
that it would be the principles of justice. In the first instance, a guarantee 
of certain individual liberties, and in the second instance, social and 
economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the least advantaged 
members of society. 
If people were in this “original position”, what principles would they 
choose? What would the basis be for deciding on principles? Rawls 
believes that we would select principles that we find just. People disagree 
on what is just and unjust and, accordingly, would make decisions based 
on their own preconceived ideas on what justice is. Rawls suggests that 
people in the “original position” should be viewed as choosing on the 
basis of self-interest. Choosing on the basis of mutual self-interest, the 
principles of justice will most likely be chosen, because people agreed to 
them under conditions of equality and free choice. There is no agreement if 
people are choosing principles based on self-interest, given the reality that 
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some rules would benefit some people and not others. Regardless of who 
they are, Rawls indicates that people want more “primary social goods” 
(income, but also rights, liberties, opportunities, status, self-respect, and 
so on). He, therefore, suspects that people in the “original position” will 
choose the principles that should govern society conservatively, because 
they are determining their own fate and that of their children. They will not 
choose a utilitarian standard, because the happiness of some might be 
sacrificed to maximise the total happiness of society. They will follow the 
maximum rule in making decisions, in order to maximise the minimum they 
could receive. 
Ultimately, people in the “original position” will approve two principles, 
after which they will design their basic social and political institutions 
in more detail, when they have more information. These principles are, 
first, that each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total 
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty 
for all and, secondly, that social and economic inequalities are to satisfy 
two conditions, namely they are to be attached to positions and offices 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and they are to 
be to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged members of 
society (Rawls 1985:227). 
The first principle takes priority over the second. At the very centre 
of Rawls’ theory is what he calls the difference principle. This states that 
inequalities are only justified when they work to the advantage of those 
members of society who are least well off. If people lack incentive to 
undertake some of the more difficult work in society, one could allow for 
certain inequalities that work to everyone’s benefit, for example paying 
people more for more productive work. This would benefit the entire 
society, also those who earn less (Rawls 1971).
Utilitarianism, in Rawls’ view, treats the pain and pleasure experienced 
by people as interchangeable. It can also lead to the unfair distribution of 
burdens and benefits in maximising the total well-being of a society. In 
response to Nozick’s entitlement theory (libertarianism), he also states that 
the primary subject of justice should be the basic structure and arranging 
it into one scheme with the fundamental social institutions. 
The subject of justice should be the basic structure of society, because 
this shapes the wants, desires, hopes, and ambitions of individuals. Rawls 
indicates that there will always be natural differences between people, but 
the weight given to these distinctions is not natural. One’s characteristics 
are simply a genetic lottery. One can, therefore, not claim credit for one’s 
attributes, not even for one’s virtues. Consequently, one cannot claim credit 
on the economic rewards of one’s characteristics (Shaw 2005:100-105).
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Rawls (1985:223) himself calls his theory “justice as fairness”. He further 
indicates that what he set out in A theory of justice is a political conception 
of justice, which is “a moral conception worked out for a specific kind 
of subject, namely, for political, social, and economic institutions” 
(Rawls 1985:224). The notion of fairness should, therefore, be built into 
the most basic structures of society, although Rawls (1985:225) is also 
quick to point out that this does not mean that a general moral conception 
should be applied to all structures.
Viewing justice as fairness tries to arbitrate between the opposing 
traditions of Locke5 and Rousseau6 in two ways, namely by stressing the 
values of freedom and equality and 
by specifying a point of view from which these principles can be 
seen as more appropriate than other familiar principles of justice to 
the nature of democratic citizens viewed as free and equal persons 
(Rawls 1985:227). 
Rawls then states that the aims of justice as fairness are practical 
rather than epistemological or metaphysical. It presents itself as a notion 
that can serve as the basis of an “informed and willing political agreement 
between citizens” (Rawls 1985:230).
Naturally, this has extensive implications for the discussion of social 
justice in terms of GE. Blackford (2014:34) refers to Allhof’s statement that 
GE is in itself morally acceptable if and only if it enhances, whether directly 
or indirectly, Rawlsian primary good, the kinds of things one should 
rationally want to have, including talents and aptitudes. In terms of justice 
as fairness, one could say that, from an ethical perspective, the utilisation 
of GE would need to be implemented according to the principle of fairness 
in order to be, according to Rawls’ theory, just.
The most problematic issue raised in the discourse on social justice, 
in my opinion, is the number of scholars who seem to find some kind of 
inequality not only desirable, but ideal. Using GE to enhance the Rawlsian 
primary goods of our children is considered redundant, if everyone is able 
to do so. In this line of thinking, Buchanan et al. (2000:185) refer to this 
as an advantageous, but collectively self-defeating intervention. Singer 
(2009:282-283) and Fukuyama (2002:95) employ the same argument; the 
latter uses intelligence as an example. 
5 Locke gives “greater weight to what Constant called ‘the liberties of the moderns’, 
freedom of thought and conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of 
property, and the rule of law” (Rawls 1985:227).
6 Rousseau “gives greater weight to what Constant called ‘the liberties of the 
ancients’, equal political liberties and the values of public life” (Rawls 1985:227).
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If everyone has children that are more intelligent, there is no gain, 
except a possible rise in economic productivity. In other words, without 
inequality also on this level and the large gap between the rich and the 
poor, those who are able to afford and access biotechnology and those 
who remain on the margins, these scholars do not perceive the benefit of 
this technology at all. This notion contradicts Rawls’ concepts of justice 
as fairness, however, as the desired inequality, for which these scholars 
argue, is at its very core about unfairness and injustice. 
This, however, does not yet answer the question as to how theology 
can contribute in a unique and valuable manner to the ethical discussion 
and, in particular, to the notion of inequality and social justice this raises. 
In the following section, I shall discuss German theologian Moltmann’s 
viewpoint on humanity dignity as one possible theological contribution.
4. A THEOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO GENETIC 
ENGINEERING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: MOLTMANN 
AND HUMAN DIGNITY
De Villiers (1993:101) indicates that, for over one and a half centuries, 
mainstream churches and Christian theology were completely opposed 
to the notion of fundamental human rights. He further states, however, 
that fundamental human rights are theologically justified, “particularly 
health care as a human right”, given that a wide spectrum of Christian 
beliefs, such as, for example, imago Dei, played a role in the historical 
development of human rights. These beliefs also suggest that Christians 
should propagate the recognition of human rights. 
That health is one of the basic needs of human beings as image 
bearers of God and that fellow human beings have the obligation 
to provide adequate health care to those who fall ill, is something 
about which the Bible leaves us in no doubt (De Villiers 1993:103). 
The conviction that all human beings have inherent value and dignity, 
simply on the basis that they are human, is in Christian theology grounded 
in the confession that human beings are created imago Dei, in the image 
of God. This also features very prominently in the work of Moltmann, quite 
extensively already in the first chapter of his publication On human dignity 
(Moltmann 1984:11-17). Bauckham (1995:115) points out that Moltmann 
grounds the human dignity of all of humanity in their creation by God. This 
precedes all forms of society and government, leaving no doubt as to the 
common humanity of all people and the God-given dignity of every person. 
It also makes the fulfilment of this dignity a task to which every human 
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being is called. Although not the focus of this contribution, all human 
beings being made in the image of God also implies equality, a notion 
that can also be tied closely to Rawls’ concept of fairness. If all people are 
equal, it follows that they should be treated as such.
Moltmann (1999:120; 2011:611) further clarifies that human dignity 
is not the elevation of human beings above other living things, and he 
continually emphasises that it cannot be upheld at the expense of nature 
(Bauckham 1995:17). He explains it as follows:
The fact that all human beings are made in the image of God is the 
foundation of human dignity. Human beings are intended to live in this 
relation to God. That gives their existence its inalienable, transcendent 
depth dimension. In their relationship to the transcendent God, 
human beings become persons whose dignity must not be infringed 
(Moltmann 1999:122).
Moltmann (1984:169) further describes human beings as made in the 
image of God as pertaining to all of the human being’s “Lebensbezügen”, 
in other words, 
the economic, social, political and personal dimensions are all 
meant to reflect the confession that we are created in God’s image 
(Kotzé 2015:210). 
Human beings are intended to live in this relation to God, and it is this 
factor that gives human existence its “inalienable, transcendent depth 
dimension” (Moltmann 1999:122). It is in their relationship to the triune God 
that human beings become beings whose dignity must not be violated.
Human dignity, Moltmann (2012:87) states, is already defined in the Old 
Testament: 
The Abrahamic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – are 
responsible for the religious background of Western civilizations, 
and they have always seen this dignity as belonging to the human 
being as the image of God.
This dignity was regarded as something that exists in the human soul, 
not in the body, for a long time. As a result of this view, the body came to 
be viewed as something that does not form part of the likeness to God 
and that the soul could simply make use of. Later still, the image to God 
came to be viewed as “the conscious subjectivity of will and perception” 
(Moltmann 2012:87). Moltmann (2012:87) indicates, however, that the 
whole of the human being is the image of God, his/her body included. For 
the discussion of human dignity as relating to the examination of social 
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justice and inequality in the larger Christian bioethical debate on GE, the 
repercussions for this assertion are that human dignity and human rights 
also refer to bodily dignity.
Moltmann (1993:49) also indicates that the crucified Christ has always 
been the Christ of the poor:
They find in him the brother who put off his divine form and took on 
the form of a slave (Phil. 2), to be with them and to love them. They 
[see] in him a God who does not torture them, as their masters do, 
but becomes their brother and companion. Where their own lives 
have been deprived of freedom, dignity and humanity, they find in 
fellowship with him respect, recognition, human dignity and hope.
Christian theology, therefore, cannot but take seriously the plight of the poor 
and the suffering. Within the context of the right to health and health care, 
Christ’s “preferential option for the poor”, as confessed in the Confession 
of Belhar, adds another very important notion to the discussion, one that 
will also be of note for exploring GE in terms of human rights and human 
dignity. In the context of GE, the preferential option for the poor should 
also be respected in health care and the utilisation of biotechnology. This 
means that one cannot argue, like Buchanan et al. (2000), Singer (2009) and 
Fukuyama (2002), and advocate in favour of inequality and social injustice, 
purely on the basis that, in order to have some primary goods, it infers 
that others must do without. This is also directly opposed to the theory of 
justice, as developed by Rawls, where the benefits of his model are clearly 
stated to be for the least well-off in society: the poor, the suffering, and the 
marginalised.
Although another ethical question would, of course, be whether these 
enhancements of human qualities are desirable and something that should 
be supported and aspired to, addressing these questions is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that one should also take note of 
the issue of social justice in discussing the genetic enhancement of 
human beings.
The right to lead a life of dignity is also an inherent part of human 
dignity. Therefore, the bigger issue of economic injustice should also be 
addressed as a closely related aspect to the wider view of social justice 
in terms of health care. For this reason, I raise the larger issue of socio-
economic justice and not simply the issues with which the conversation 
on social justice directly confronts GE, such as the inequality that would 
exist in access and affordability. Given the large discrepancies that exist 
in the health-care sector at present, these concerns can very easily be 
argued away as subsisting with or without biotechnology. In this regard, 
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as indicated earlier, one can simply state that the social injustices to which 
they refer are present in any case and that it does not, in a unique way, 
contribute to the Christian bioethical discussion on GE. Arguing in this 
way, without taking the broader socio-economic context into account, 
could lead one to make the case that, because the inequalities and these 
forms of biotechnologies could exacerbate what already exists, it does 
not add something original to the bioethical discourse. Consequently, this 
should be regarded as less important than other ethical issues that emerge 
in the utilisation of biotechnology.
5. CONCLUSION
In Moltmann’s theology, 
God is a God of promises, promises that open up a future into which 
the people may enter in obedience ... Something which yet is not 
and thus opens the future (Rasmussen 1995:62).
Rasmussen (1995:62) also states that “the promises of God have their 
ground not in history itself, but in God and in God’s faithfulness”. This 
means that the future that is promised cannot be deduced from the present 
reality; God’s promise is something that is not yet; therefore, it stands 
in contradiction with the present. It is not a rigid scheme; there is room 
for surprises, promises that transcend historical fulfilment and point to 
fulfilment in the future, creating a history of promise. In Moltmann’s words: 
“Discipleship, which concerns life here and now, exists in the horizon of 
the coming kingdom. It criticizes what is in terms of what is promised” 
(Rasmussen 1995:64).
In light of this perspective, this contribution explores the present 
South African reality as part of the life that exists here and now, standing 
in contradiction to the eagerly awaited promised future. Taking its cue 
from Moltmann’s view on Christian discipleship, this article serves to 
criticise the present reality, with its inequalities, especially in this context, 
relating to health and health-care services as part of the greater debate 
surrounding GE.
The ethos of learning to live with brokenness, imperfection and 
vulnerability that Moltmann propagates, also be referring to the 
suffering of and vulnerability of God, is of immense value to the 
discourse of GE (Kotzé 2015:213).
Moltmann particularly referred to the reality that God is perceived most 
clearly in God’s broken and vulnerable humanity. In understanding the 
whole of creation through the event of the cross, this notion also becomes 
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especially applicable. Moltmann’s trinitarian doctrine of creation helps 
the Christian bioethical discussion on GE in explicitly campaigning for the 
utilisation of available biotechnologies to heal and cure, thereby enhancing 
human dignity, justice and fairness as part of the bioethical discourse. 
Furthermore, Moltmann’s theology also helps Christian bioethical dialogue 
by resisting a culture or ethos that cannot live with vulnerability. Moltmann 
examines creation and human beings through the lens of God who suffers 
in and through Jesus Christ. Although I derive a theological mandate in 
favour of GE from his theology (Moltmann 2012:79, 80, 110, 127), I by no 
means infer from him a flight from vulnerability, brokenness and suffering 
that aims to become “transhuman”. I do not gather from his position an 
idealisation and even idolisation of medical technology. His theological 
perspectives do indeed encourage one to support medical, scientific 
and technological progress. It not only supports the quest for health and 
health care, but also acknowledges the limitations in the best that one can 
achieve as human beings.
The focus on human dignity in Moltmann’s theology and the notion of 
justice as fairness put forward by Rawls can help one address bioethical 
challenges in the context of inequality, specifically in a country such as 
South Africa. Furthermore, it can help us build a life of dignity for the 
socially excluded ones in society and, therefore, work for socio-economic 
conditions that speak of justice, fairness and dignity and that make this 
technology accessible to all.
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